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Sammendrag 
Tidligere studier har stilt spørsmål ved om fremme av biodrivstoff virkelig fører til reduserte CO2-
utslipp på kort sikt. Denne artikkelen har to viktige bidrag sammenlignet med tidligere forskning. For 
det første tar vi hensyn til at fossile brensler er ikke-fornybare ressurser. For det andre tar vi eksplisitt 
hensyn til utslipp som følge av endret arealbruk når vi vurderer effekten av ulike typer politikk rettet 
mot biodrivstoff. Vi finner at utvinning av fossile brensler reduseres initialt når det innføres en 
innblandingsandel for biodrivstoff, gitt at etterspørselen etter drivstoff er lineær eller konkav. Videre 
finner vi at selv om utslipp fra biodrivstoff er nesten like høye som fra fossile brensler, kan et 
innblandingskrav ha positive klimaeffekter. Dette skyldes at et slikt krav trolig vil redusere den totale 
bruken av drivstoff de første tiårene. Denne konklusjonen gjelder også dersom bare noen land innfører 
slik politikk. 
1 Introduction
More than 20% of energy-related CO2 emissions come from the transport sector, and
governments are therefore looking for alternatives to fossil fuels in this sector. Biofuels are
currently the most employed alternative, accounting for 2-3 percent of global transport-
related energy use (IEA, 2011a).
The advantage of biofuels is that they are relatively easy to introduce into the transport
sector. While hydrogen and battery driven cars at the moment imply both more expensive
and somewhat inferior technologies, cars run on biofuels have approximately the same
performance as cars run on fossil fuels and can use the same infrastructure. The US and
a number of European countries have introduced various support schemes for deployment
of biofuels leading to strong growth in global biofuels production and use. Clearly, the
support has not only been driven by a concern for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as
both the EU and the US have invoked arguments about energy securityand the need
for regional development.
Current support schemes involve the use of a myriad of policies. For instance, the
EU has imposed a biofuels target of 10% in 2020, and a mixture of blending mandates,
excise tax rebates to biofuels, subsidies to growing of biofuels crops, and tari¤s on imported
biofuels have been introduced in the EU countries (Eggert, Greaker and Potter, 2011). The
US has a renewable fuel standard (RFS), which is similar to a blending mandate, and a
tari¤ on imported biofuels in addition to various tax reliefs (Eggert, Greaker and Potter,
2011). The complex support schemes have spurred an emerging literature analyzing the
combined e¤ect of these schemes, see, e.g., DeGorter and Just (2010), Lapan and Moschini
(2010) and Eggert and Greaker (2012).
Recent contributions have also questioned whether rst generation biofuels actually
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lead to any short-run GHG reductions. Obvious sources of emissions include the use of
fertilizer when growing biofuels crops (Crutzen et al, 2008), and the use of fossil energy
in the harvesting and processing of biofuels (Macedo et al, 2008). Land use change can
lead to additional GHG emissions if the area of arable land is increased to accommodate
increasing use of biofuels. Fargione et al. (2008) introduced the concept of carbon debt,
and hold that in the worst case scenario it may take up to several hundred years to reach
climate neutrality after such conversion.
In this paper we make two contributions to the literature. With very few exceptions
most of the literature studying the market e¤ects of biofuels policies have treated fossil
fuel as a traditional commodity, or simply modeled fossil fuel supply as innitely elastic.
In this paper we model fossil fuel supply taking explicitly into account that fossil fuels are
non-renewable natural resources. Thus, we model forward looking, competitive suppliers.1
Furthermore, to our knowledge no previous studies have combined new knowledge on emis-
sions from land use change with market e¤ects of biofuels policies, assessing the e¤ects on
climate costs, that is, damage costs from climate change.
There are two strands of literature that study the e¤ects of biofuels policies. One
strand studies GHG emissions from increased use of biofuels without taking into account
the interaction with the fossil fuel market. Examples of this literature are Searchinger et al
(2008) and Lapola et al. (2010). They both nd that increased use of biofuels may lead to
increased GHG emissions due to land use change. In these analyses it is implicitly assumed
that biofuels will replace fossil fuels on a one-to-one basis (based on energy content).
The second strand of literature emphasizes that one should also analyze the market
1We do not consider market power in the oil market. This has been studied by Hochman et al. (2011)
and Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2012), who consider the e¤ects of biofuels policies taking into account
OPEC behaviour. However, both these studies use static analysis.
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e¤ects of these policies. In DeGorter and Just (2009) a renewable fuel standard may lead
to a decrease in total fuel sales. This happens if the elasticity of biofuels supply is lower
than the elasticity of fossil fuel supply. The e¤ect of the policy is then not only to replace
fossil fuels with biofuels, but also to reduce total consumption of transport fuels, which by
itself will reduce climate costs. Note that this result is reversed if the elasticity of biofuels
supply is higher than the elasticity of fossil fuel supply, or if a biofuels subsidy is imposed
rather than a renewable fuel standard (DeGorter and Just, 2009).
Introducing several instruments complicates the picture even further. If a renewable
fuel standard is in place, adding a tax rebate for biofuels or a subsidy to biofuels can only
make things worse with respect to climate costs. The subsidy then works as an implicit
support to fossil fuels and, hence, GHG emissions increase (see DeGorter and Just, 2010).
Lapan and Mochini (2010) compare a renewable fuel standard to a price based consumption
subsidy, and nd that the former welfare dominates the latter. A renewable fuel standard
is identical to a tax on fossil fuels and a subsidy to biofuels for which the tax and subsidy
rates are set such that the tax income is equal to the subsidy outlay (Eggert and Greaker,
2012). It then follows that a blending mandate outperforms a pure subsidy (i.e., without
a tax) in cases in which there is an emission externality.
All the market e¤ects mentioned above are derived in static models. The robustness
of these results should therefore be analyzed in a model with dynamic fossil fuel supply.
One such example is Chakravorty et al. (2008), who study the supply of biofuels when the
stock of pollution from fossil fuels is regulated.2 The results in Chakravorty et al. (2008)
depend on the availability of land and the demand for land for alternative uses (e.g., food).
One of the ndings is that if land is abundant, biofuels behave as a textbook backstop
2Note that there are no emissions from biofuels in Chakravorty et al. (2008).
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resource.
The future of biofuels seems to lie within so-called second generation biofuels, which to
a large extent can be grown on pastures and currently unused land (IEA, 2011b). Thus,
we follow Chakravorty et al. (2008) by treating biofuels as a textbook backstop resource.
On the other hand, whereas Chakravorty et al. consider a cap on the stock of emissions,
we focus on a renewable fuel standard which is the policy used both in the EU and the
US.3 First, we nd that the extraction period of the fossil fuel resource is extended by the
introduction of a renewable fuel standard. This happens even if only a subset of countries
introduces the standard, while the rest of the world continues without. Second, if fuel
demand is linear, total fuel consumption will unambiguously decline initially. Finally, we
show that a biofuels subsidy speeds up fossil fuel extraction and, hence, GHG emissions
increase, conrming the ndings from static models.
Given that we know the market e¤ects of a renewable fuel standard, we can also study
the e¤ects upon climate costs, taking into account the e¤ects of biofuels usage on land
use changes. A biofuels standard has two opposing e¤ects: It reduces climate costs due
to the postponement of fossil fuel extraction, but increases climate costs due to higher
accumulated emissions (because of more biofuels production that also involves emissions).
In order to evaluate the relative strengths of these e¤ects, we calibrate a numerical model
of fossil fuel extraction and demand. We nd that even for biofuels that are almost as
emissions-intensive as oil, a blending mandate may have a benecial climate e¤ect. The
reason is that the blending mandate reduces total fuel demand over the rst few decades.
Thus, even though cumulative fuel demand and emissions are increased, emissions are
postponed, giving a benecial climate e¤ect.
3In our paper a renewable fuel standard is identical to a blending mandate as both policies require that
biofuels constitute a given share of total fuel use in the transport sector.
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Despite the benecial climate e¤ect, a renewable fuel standard always reduces total
welfare in our numerical model runs. A renewable fuel standard implies a subsidy to
biofuels alongside a tax on fossil fuels. A subsidy to biofuels hampers welfare in our model
since there are no other externalities than the climate externality.
The paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2 we study the e¤ects of a blending mandate
in a one region model. In Section 3 we extend the model to the two region case. In Section
4 we treat the climate costs from fossil fuels and biofuels, respectively. In Section 5 we
provide a numerical illustration of the model. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.
2 Market e¤ects of mandatory biofuels use
We consider a market with fossil fuels (x) and biofuels (y), which are assumed to be perfect
substitutes.4 The stock of fossil fuels (S) is xed, and there are no costs of extracting this
stock. Unit costs of producing biofuels (b) are xed. Hence, we treat biofuels as a textbook
backstop technology.5 Without any climate policy, the fossil fuel price is p(t) = p0ert until
p(T ) = b is reached at T , when a complete switch to biofuels occurs.
The assumption that fossil fuels are given in a xed supply with constant unit costs of
extraction might seem very restrictive. As shown by e.g. Gerlagh (2011) and Hoel (2011)
the e¤ects of a carbon tax are quite di¤erent for this case and the more realistic case of
extraction costs increasing in accumulated extraction. In the latter case total extraction
(and hence total emissions) are determined endogenously, and are lower the higher is the
level of a carbon tax. However, our focus in not on a carbon tax, but on a blending mandate.
Total extraction (but not the timing of extraction) is independent of a blending mandate.
4We may think of fossil fuels as oil here, as we are interested in the transport sector and the competition
from biofuels. Thus, we implicitly abstract from oil use in other sectors, as well as other substitutes to oil
in the transport sector such as electric cars, which may become important in the future.
5The realism of this assumption is discussed in the concluding section.
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The reason for this is that both with and without a blending mandate all resources with
extraction costs below the backstop price b will eventually be extracted, and no resources
with higher extraction costs will be extracted. Hence, assuming an exogenous total amount
of fossil fuel resources is far less restrictive in the present analysis than the same assumption
is when the focus is on the e¤ects of a carbon tax.
Assume that fuel consumers are required to use at least a share  of biofuels in the
total fuel use. We coin  a renewable fuel standard (RFS). Let the consumer price of fuels
be given by pC(t). We then have pC(t) = b + (1   )p0ert. Further, let the demand for
fuel be given by D(pC), with D0 < 0. The demand for fossil fuels and biofuels is then:
x(t) = (1  )D(b+ (1  )p0ert) for t < T (1)
y(t) = D(b+ (1  )p0ert) for t < T (2)
x(t) = 0 and y(t) = D(b) for t  T (3)
where T is determined by:
p0e
rT = b (4)
Finally, we have the equilibrium condition:
Z T
0
x(t)dt = S (5)
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The endogenous variables in equations 1 - 5 are x(t), y(t), T and p0. If p0 is known,
the whole price path is known from p(t) = p0ert.
We are now ready to investigate how an increase in  a¤ects the market equilibrium.
2.1 E¤ects on resource extraction
First, we examine how the extraction time T and the initial resource price p0 are a¤ected
by a change in . We can show the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the share of biofuels in an RFS system is increased, the fossil fuel re-
source will last longer. Moreover, the intial price of the resource falls.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Obviously, the proposition also holds if we introduce an RFS, i.e., increase  from zero.
The intuition of this proposition is quite clear: If the resource price didnt fall, demand
for fossil fuels would have to decrease in every period, which subsequently implies that there
are resources left in the ground at time T when the fossil fuel price reaches the backstop
price b.
Next, we examine the e¤ects on the extraction path. We can then show:
Proposition 2 Assume that fuel demand is concave or linear. If the share of biofuels in
an RFS system is increased, extraction of fossil fuels will decline for all t < bt, and increase
for all t > bt.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This proposition is also quite intuitive. As the resource extraction is extended, average
extraction per period until the "old" T must come down. The proposition states that
extraction declines at every point of time until some bt. Moreover, between the "old" and
the "new" T , extraction obviously increases.
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If fuel demand is convex, we cannot rule out the possibility that initial extraction
increases. The explanation is that with convex demand, demand may be more price elastic
at low prices. Thus, if the initial consumer price (pC) decreases in line with lower fossil
fuel price (p0), fuel demand may be stimulated substantially so that even demand for fossil
fuels increases.
2.2 E¤ects on fuel consumption and biofuels production
In order to investigate the e¤ects on total fuel demand, we assume that demand is a linear
function of the consumer price. We can show the following:
Proposition 3 Assume that fuel demand is linear. If the share of biofuels in an RFS
system is increased, the consumer price will increase (decrease) and fuel consumption will
decrease (increase) for all t < (>)bt, where 0 < bt < T .
Proof: See the Appendix.6
The consumer price is pulled in both directions. On the one hand, the fossil fuel price p
decreases. On the other hand, a higher  increases the weighted price pC = b+ (1 )p.
According to the proposition, the latter e¤ect is dominating initially, at least if the demand
function is linear. Note that this holds whether the demand function is steep or not, as
long as the choke price pCmax  b.
When t approaches T , both the fossil fuel price and the consumer price approaches T .
Thus, for t su¢ ciently close to the "old" T , the consumer price must decrease when  is
increased (since p drops). Hence, for linear demand, total fuel consumption declines at
early dates, and increases at later dates.
6Note that the value of t^ is generally not the same in Propositions 2, 3 and subsequent propositions
where this symbol is used.
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The RFS is introduced to stimulate the use of biofuels. The following proposition states
how biofuels production is a¤ected when  is increased:
Proposition 4 If the share of biofuels in an RFS system is increased, production of bio-
fuels will increase if either i)  is su¢ ciently small initially, ii) demand is su¢ ciently
inelastic, or iii) t is su¢ ciently close to T . On the other hand, biofuels production will
decrease initially if  is already su¢ ciently close to 1 and demand is linear and su¢ ciently
elastic.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The rst result, i.e., that biofuels production expands if at least one of three conditions is
fullled, is as expected. The last result, i.e., that biofuels production could in fact decrease,
may seem counter-intuitive at rst. We know from above that the initial consumer price
increases when  is increased. If demand is very elastic, fuel consumption may then drop
quite substantially. Furthermore, if there is already a signicant biofuels consumption due
to a high , it is possible that the e¤ect of demand reduction dominates the e¤ect of a
higher share of biofuels. Similar results have been found in static analysis of Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS) (or tradable green certicate markets), see e.g. Amundsen and
Mortensen [1].
To summarize, we have shown that introducing or strengthening an RFS system will
lead to lower fossil fuel prices, and prolonged extraction period. If demand is concave or
linear, fossil fuel production will decrease initially, and increase in later periods so that
total extraction is unchanged. Finally, if demand is linear, the consumer price will increase
initially, implying lower initial fuel consumption, but in later periods the price will drop
and fuel consumption increase. Biofuels production will most likely increase, but could
decrease initially if demand is su¢ ciently elastic and  is already high.
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2.3 E¤ects of biofuels subsidy in addition to RFS
A number of countries, including the U.S. and the EU, have or have had subsidies to
biofuels production in addition to a RFS. Such subsidies will stimulate biofuels production
and consumption, but due to the binding relationship between fossil fuel and biofuels
consumption given by the RFS, fossil consumption will also be stimulated. We can show
this formally, and have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If a binding RFS is in place, a subsidy to biofuels production will reduce
the extraction time for the fossil fuel resource, and increase (decrease) the use of fossil fuels
for all t < (>)bt, where 0 < bt < T .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, introducing subsidies to biofuels production may have quite the contrary e¤ect
of what is the purpose, at least if the subsidy is introduced for environmental reasons. In
reality, such subsidies may be temporary. Nevertheless, given a binding RFS, any policy
that stimulates biofuels use will also stimulate the use of fossil fuels.
3 Two region model
So far we have considered a closed one region model, which could be thought of as the
whole world. However, although many countries apply a RFS for biofuels, policies are not
synchronized. For instance, both the EU and the U.S. have a RFS, but the mandates di¤er
both with respect to the fraction of biofuels in the transport market and to how long the
blending mandates are executed. Further, several large countries such as China do not at
present have any mandate at all. The question then arises whether the results obtained so
far also hold for a single region trading with other regions with no or weaker mandates.
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Hoel (2011) shows that the e¤ects of introducing carbon prices can have quite di¤erent
e¤ects in a two country model compared to a one country model.
With more regions one would expect carbon leakage to occur. That is, regions not
tightening their RFS increase their use of fossil fuels as a result of a stronger RFS in a
single region. In order to analyze the strength of this e¤ect, we extend the model to two
regions, and consider the case where only one region strengthen its mandate. The initial
mandate may di¤er between the regions. We still assume world market prices on fossil
fuels and biofuels, and a given total stock of fossil fuels.
The RFS requires consumers of fossil fuels in Region i to use at least a share i of biofuels
in the total fuel use. The consumer price in region i is therefore pCi (t) = ib+ (1  i)p(t)
where as above p(t) = p0ert. Biofuels is still a backstop technology, and when p(T ) = b is
reached at T , a complete switch to biofuels occurs in both regions. Thus, the RFS is only
binding as long as b > p(t).
The demand for fossil fuels and biofuels is
xi(t) = (1  i)Di(ib+ (1  i)p0ert) for t < T (6)
yi(t) = iDi(ib+ (1  i)p0ert) for t < T (7)
where xi(t) = 0 for t  T , yi(t) = Di(b) for t  T and where where T is determined
by p0erT = b. Finally, for a given initial resource stock S we must have the equilibrium
condition
Z T
0
x1(t)dt+
Z T
0
x2(t)dt = S (8)
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The model is solved in the Appendix. Interestingly, we nd that the results are very
similar to the results with only one region: The extraction time will be extended indepen-
dent of which region that tightens its RFS, and the initial price of fossil fuels declines.
Moreover, if the demand functions in the two regions are linear, fossil fuel extraction
will decline for all t < bt, and increase for all t > bt (for some 0 < bt < T ). If one or
both demand functions have second order derivatives unequal to zero, the e¤ects on the
extraction path are ambiguous. Thus, Propositions 1 carry over to the case with two
regions, while Proposition 2 only partly carries over.
The consumer price on transportation fuels in the region not changing its RFS must
fall at all dates due to the lower fossil fuel price. Hence, we will have carbon leakage as this
region will use more fossil fuels at each date due to the increased RFS rate in the other
region. If the former region also has an RFS in place, it follows that it will also increase
its use of biofuels. If fossil extraction declines in the initial periods, fossil fuel consumption
in the region with increased RFS must fall in these periods. It is more ambiguous what
happens to biofuels consumption in this region, and to fossil fuel consumption after time
bt.
4 Climate costs of an RFS
We will now consider the e¤ect of the RFS on the costs of climate change. The use of fossil
fuels leads to ow emissions, while emissions from use of biofuels potentially include both
ow emissions and emissions from stock changes (related to land use changes). We rst
discuss the climate costs of fossil fuels and biofuels separately, before we combine them
and look at the e¤ects of an RFS on climate costs.
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4.1 Climate costs from using fossil fuels
Burning fossil fuels releases carbon to the atmosphere, which will gradually decline over
time, as it is transferred to other sinks. However, a signicant portion (about 25% according
to e.g. Archer, 2005) remains in the atmosphere for ever (or at least for thousands of years).
We model this similarly to Farzin and Tahvonen (1996). The carbon in the atmosphere
at any time t is articially split into two components A1(t) + A2(t): component 1 that
remains in the atmosphere for ever and component 2 that gradually depreciates at a rate
. For each unit emitted the share that remains in the atmosphere for ever is denoted .
The amount of 1 unit of carbon emissions at time t remaining in the atmosphere z years
after the emission date is thus  + (1  )e z. If e.g.  = 0:013 and  = 0:25, 45 % of the
original emissions will remain in the atmosphere after 100 years, while 27 % still remains
after 300 years. These numbers are roughly in line with what is suggested by Archer (2005)
and others.
At any time t, climate costs are C(A1(t) + A2(t)), where A1(t) + A2(t) is carbon from
fossil fuels; carbon from land use changes is ignored for now. Consider the climate damage
caused by 1 unit of emissions from burning fossil fuels at time t. The total additional
damage caused by 1 unit of carbon emissions at time t is the sum of additional damages at
all dates from t to innity caused by the additional stocks from t to innity. To get from
additional stocks at t+ z to additional damages at t+ z we must multiply the additional
stocks at t + z by the marginal damage at t + z, which is C 0(A1(t + z) + A2(t + z)). The
marginal damage of 1 additional unit of emissions at t, often denoted the social cost of
carbon, is thus given by
qx(t) =
Z 1
0
e rz

 + (1  )e zC 0(A1(t+ z) + A2(t+ z))dz (9)
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For C 00 > 0 the social cost of carbon will vary over time. While A1(t) is increasing as long
as emissions are positive, A2(t) may be declining for su¢ ciently low emissions. In any case,
C 0 and hence qx(t) will change over time.7 To simplify the formal analysis we assume that
C 00 = 0, i.e. that damages are linear in the atmospheric stock . When C 0 is constant (9)
may be rewritten as
qx =


r
+
1  
r + 

C 0 (10)
which is constant over time.
4.2 Climate costs from using biofuels
Growing and processing biofuels entails greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but to what
extent is a controversial topic. According to life-cycle analyses the emission sources can
be grouped into the following categories: (I) fossil fuel usage for harvesting, transporting
and production, (II) N2O emissions from fertilizer usage and the crop itself, (III) direct
land-use change, and (IV) indirect land-use change (see e.g. Macedo et al. 2008, Khanna
and Crago, 2011).
It seems reasonable that the renewable fuel standard encompasses fossil fuels used for
harvesting and transporting in the agricultural sector. Thus, source (I) is to some degree
included in our model already.8 With respect to energy for production of biofuels, this
is in many cases provided from the biofuel crop itself. For instance, sugarcane ethanol
production often also supplies electricity. To our knowledge such posibillities also exsist
7Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) give a detailed analysis of how v(t) might develop over time when C 00 > 0.
8Ideally, source (I) could be incorporated into our model by taking into account that total fuel demand
is an increasing function of y(t). This could alter the extraction path of x(t), but obviously not S. As
the RFS policy implies that this extra fuel demand would be proportional to x(t), it seems unlikely that
the extraction path would be much altered either. Moreover, harvesting and transporting biofuels crops
probably make up a rather small share of total transportation fuel demand.
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for second generation biofuels (Schmer et al., 2008).
Furthermore, according to Crutzen et al. (2008) source (II) may be signicant for some
kinds of rst generation biofuels, but not so much for second generation biofuels based on
energy crops. Hence, in the following we will assume that the climate costs of biofuels only
follow from land use changes, i.e., (III) and (IV). This is of course a simplication, and it
is straightforward to add ow emissions to the expressions below.
Emissions from direct land-use change is treated by Fargione et al. (2008). Their study
shows that converting di¤erent types of virgin land to crop land may give high initial
emissions, coined by Fargione et al. as carbon debt. Biofuels crops are however often grown
on existing agricultural land. Indirect land use change then refers to changes in land use
that occurs through changes in the market prices for food and land. Both Searchinger et
al. (2008) and Lapola et al. (2010) analyze indirect land-use change, and show that the
e¤ect upon emissions may be of great signicance.
In our model we treat direct land-use change and indirect land-use change together. In
particular, we assume that the global area for food crop is kept constant, and thus that a
certain production level of biofuels have led to a one time boost in emissions as the growing
of every new non-food crop must increase the total area of cultivated land globally. We
will now turn to how this can be modeled.
4.3 Climate costs from land use changes
It is useful to rst consider the case of  = 1, so that all emissions from fossil fuel use
remain in the atmosphere for ever. In this case the climate cost of each unit of x is
qx =
C 0
r
(11)
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What is the corresponding climate cost of each unit of y? Assume that each unit of y
requires ` units of land, and that each unit of land converted to biofuels production will
reduce the carbon sequestered on this land by an amount . Note that  will depend on
the type of initial land and on the type of biofuels production. For some types (barren
land transformed to an energy forest)  may be negative. In the subsequent discussion we
assume  > 0. The parameter ` will also vary across types of biofuels.9
As before, A stands for cumulative emissions from fossil fuels. The total amount of
carbon in the atmosphere at date t is A(t) + `y(t). Notice that this formulation implies
that any increase in y will immediately release carbon to the atmosphere. This is not an
unreasonable assumption. However, the formulation also implies that any reduction in
y immediately sequesters carbon from the atmosphere. This is obviously unrealistic; in
reality, the sequestration takes time. Hence, our formulation makes biofuels production
more climate friendly than it is in reality if we have a declining y(t).
Climate damages at date t are C(A(t) + `y(t)). The negative climate impact of the
production of biofuels is thus modeled just as any ow pollutant, and the climate cost per
unit of y is
qy = `C
0
With  = 1 it follows that
qy
qx
= r` (12)
For the more realistic case of  < 1, some of the carbon released to the atmosphere when
burning fossil fuels is gradually transferred to other carbon sinks   mainly the ocean. The
9Alternatively, the biofuel crop is grown on already developed agricultural land. We then assume that
virgin land must be converted some other place to upkeep the production of the replaced agricultural
products.
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atmosphere doesnt recognize any di¤erence between carbon from fossil fuel use and carbon
from land use changes. Therefore, we must make a similar assumption about a gradual
transfer from the atmosphere to other sinks also for such carbon emissions. We give a
formal analysis of this in the Appendix, where it is shown that (12) is valid also for this
case. In this Appendix we also consider the slightly more general case of the equilibrium
value of C 0 rising at a constant rate m 2 [0; r). One interpretation of m > 0 is that the
climate damage function has the form
C(A; t) = C 00e
mtA
Climate damage increasing with income and production is in fact often assumed, see e.g.
Nordhaus (2008) or EEAG (2012). For the case of m > 0 we show that (10) and (12)
generalize to
qx(t) =


r  m +
1  
r +   m

C 00e
mt (13)
and
qy(t)
qx(t)
= (r  m)`   (14)
4.4 The e¤ects of an RFS on climate costs
In section 2 we showed how the introduction of an RFS for biofuels a¤ects the time paths
for the use of fossil fuel and biofuels. The e¤ect on climate costs of the introduction of
an RFS will depend on the size of  dened by (14). For the limiting case of  = 0 the
only e¤ect on climate costs will be through the change in the time prole of fossil fuel
extraction. If extraction is delayed climate costs will go down, since ertqx(t) is declining
over time. By continuity, the following proposition hence follows from Proposition 2:
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Proposition 6 If  dened by (14) is su¢ ciently small and demand for fuel is linear
or concave, climate costs will decline as a consequence of the introduction of an RFS for
biofuels.
For larger values of  it is not obvious how climate costs are a¤ected by an RFS, even
if fossil fuel use is postponed. The reason for this is that biofuels use increases for low
values of t, but declines for higher values of t (until the date at which fossil fuel use is zero
both with and without the RFS), see Proposition 1 and 4. The isolated e¤ect of this is to
increase climate costs. There are thus two opposing e¤ects: Reduced climate costs due to
the postponement of fossil fuel extraction, and increased climate costs due to advancement
in time of biofuels production. Which e¤ects is strongest will depend on , and the latter
e¤ect will dominate if  is su¢ ciently large. We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 7 If  dened by (14) is su¢ ciently large, climate costs will increase as a
consequence of the introduction of an RFS for biofuels.
The e¤ects of an RFS on climate costs is hence an empirical issue. In the next section
we give some numerical estimates of the parameters determining  dened by (14), and
compare the e¤ects of an RFS policy with the e¤ects of an optimal tax policy.
5 Numerical illustrations
5.1 Model calibration
We calibrate the model to real world data in the following way: We consider two linear
fuel demand functions, with either elastic or inelastic demand. The initial price elasticities
in the two cases are respectively  0:4 and  0:1 , but the elasticities are increasing with
the price (due to linear demand). The demand functions are calibrated so that initial fuel
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demand equals global oil consumption in 2011 if the initial price equals the average crude
oil price in 2011 (BP, 2012). Fuel consumption growth (for given price) is set to 1.3% p.a.,
which is slightly more than what the IEA (2011a) assumes until 2035 in combination with
higher oil prices.
The stock of fossil fuels (S) is set equal to remaining global oil reserves at the end of
2011, according to BP (2012). This may underestimate the ultimate recoverable amount
of oil, but on the other hand we will assume constant unit extraction costs. Unit costs
of biofuels are (preliminary) set to two times the crude oil price in 2011. Biofuels can
be produced at lower costs today, but remember that we consider biofuels as a backstop
technology with unlimited supply at a constant unit costs. We may think of this as e.g.
cellulosic ethanol. Unit costs of fossil fuels are calibrated so that the initial oil price
and consumption are consistent with the 2011 data. This leaves us with unit costs of
respectively 83% and 79% of the oil price under elastic and inelastic demand, which seems
fairly reasonable.
The initial shadow cost of carbon is set to $50 per ton of CO2, which is within the
range of CO2 prices suggested to reach ambitious climate targets (e.g., IPCC, 2007; Stern,
2007; IEA, 2011a).10 Converted to oil, the initial carbon cost (qx) amounts to 19% of the
initial oil price. Further, we assume a discount rate of r = 4%, and an income growth of
m = 2%. In line with Section 3 we set  = 0:013 and  = 0:25.
Based on the discussion above, we only consider emissions from land use change for
the climate costs of biofuels. Moreover, we have tried to nd gures for second genera-
10Ideally, the shadow cost of carbon should be based on a global cost-benet analysis. One prominent
example of a CBA study is the Stern Review (2007). Their ndings suggest that the present social cost of
carbon is around $85 per ton CO2 if the world continues on the BaU path, and $2530 if the concentration
of CO2-equivalents stabilises between 450550 ppm CO2e. Most other CBA studies seem to nd lower
shadow costs of carbon. Both these studies and the Stern Review have been much critized for various
reasons, see, e.g., Weitzman (2007, 2011) who in particular emphazises the role of uncertainty.
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tion biofuels of which cellulosic ethanol based on perennial grasses seems to be the most
promising(Eggert, Greaker and Potter, 2011). For perennial grasses Sanderson (2006) re-
ports ethanol yields from 2500 kg to 6000 kg per hectare per year (kg/ha*y). In our
numerical illustration we use a yield of 4200 kg/ha*y, which is the average of the lower and
upper bound of yields from Sanderson (2006).11 Further, according to Plevin et al (2010)
the emission factor for converted grassland is 75-200 tonne CO2/ha. Since ethanol contains
about 7.4 kWh/kg, the land use change emissions from ethanol is hence given as 3.2-8.6 kg
CO2 per kWh. Emissions from gasoline are 0.27 kilo CO2/kWh. Thus, for the product `
we get a value in the range [8:9; 23:7]. Clearly, higher yields may signicantly reduce this
number. For instance, if the yield is 6000 kg/ha*y, the interval of ` becomes [6:3; 16:7]. In
our simulations we mainly use l = 16; 3, i.e., the average of the rst interval. This implies
that the shadow costs of biofuels amount to 33% of the shadow costs of oil (per energy
unit), i.e.,  = 0:33 (cf. (14)). However, as there is large variation across di¤erent biofuels,
as well as signicant uncertainties, we will at the end of the next section consider which
levels of  that make the RFS policy climate neutral (compared to the BaU scenario).
5.2 Simulation results
We rst compare the e¤ects of blending mandates with the e¤ects of an optimal climate
policy scenario, which in our model can be implemented by imposing a Pigovian tax on
the use of fossil fuels and biofuels. We search for the level of  that gives the same present
value of reduced climate costs as the Pigovian tax. This turns out to be  = 0:48 (0:61) in
the case with inelastic (elastic) demand, given the calibrated model as described above.12
11For comparison, Plevin et al (2010) reports the average the corn ethanol yield to be 3150 kg/ha*y,
while IEA (2011b) reports the sugarcane ethanol yield to be 3900 kg/ha*y.
12Such large values of  will of course require an enormous growth in biofuels production, which will lead
to substantial land use changes and presumably sigincant interactions with other parts of the economy
(e.g., agriculture). Moreover, it is not realistic that such a large production growth may take place on
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Figure 1: Producer price of oil under di¤erent scenarios
Here we discuss the case with inelastic demand only   the qualitative results are the same
with elastic demand.
The two policies give very di¤erent market and welfare e¤ects. Total welfare is reduced
by 6% when choosing the RFS instead of the tax, and the RFS scenario is also reducing
welfare compared to the BaU scenario. In fact, this is the case whatever the level of  is.
The RFS policy is particularly detrimental for fossil fuel producers. Whereas the Pigov-
ian tax reduces prots of these producers by 30%, prots are reduced by two thirds under
the RFS policy. The initial price of oil is reduced by almost 15% in the latter case (cf.
Figure 1), which means that the initial resource rent is reduced by two thirds. In the tax
scenario, the initial oil price declines by 6%.
Consumer surplus is somewhat lower in the tax scenario than under the RFS policy,
short notice. Thus, the numerical simulations should not be taken too literally.
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Figure 2: Consumer price of transport fuel under di¤erent scenarios
but not if the emission tax revenues are allocated back to the consumers. Thus, consumers
might prefer the RFS policy if they are ignorant about public revenues, which may partly
explain the popularity of blending mandates over emission taxes. On the other hand, the
initial consumer price increases much more under the RFS policy than with a tax (cf.
Figure 2), as the high level of  requires a large share of expensive biofuels. Thus, total
fuel use is reduced much more initially under the RFS than under the tax. After about 25
years, the consumer price becomes higher under the tax policy, as the consumer price is
more stable under the RFS policy due to the smaller resource rent.
Another possible explanation for the popularity of RFS might be that biofuels are
thought to be environmentally friendly, or almost climate neutral, and that a blending
mandate of  is assumed to reduce climate costs by close to %. This is clearly not the
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Figure 3: Fossil and biofuel production under di¤erent scenarios
case. In the optimal tax scenario, climate costs are reduced by 10%, while we have seen
above that a similar reduction under RFS policy requires an  of around 50%. This is
partly because emissions from biofuels are far from negligible, and partly because the RFS
policy does not reduce cumulative use of fossil fuels over time. Over the rst 40 years,
however, fossil fuel production is almost halved, but the extraction period is extended
from 44-45 years in the BaU and Tax scenarios to 71 years in the RFS scenario (cf. Figure
3).
Even if the RFS policy is welfare deteriorating, it clearly reduces climate costs given
our assumed value of  = 0:33 (i.e., qy=qx = 0:33). An interesting question, given the
uncertainty of emissions from biofuels (and variation across sites), is how large must 
be before the RFS becomes counter-productive, i.e., increases climate costs? This could
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clearly depend on the stringency of the RFS policy. If we consider levels of  in the range
10   20%, we nd that the RFS policy is climate-neutral if  is in the range 0:93   1.
That is, even for biofuels that are almost as emissions-intensive as oil, the RFS policy
may have some benecial climate e¤ects. The reason is that the RFS policy reduces total
fuel demand over the rst few decades. Thus, even though cumulative fuel demand and
emissions are increased, emissions are postponed which gives a benecial climate e¤ect.
In Section 3 we considered a model with two regions, and discussed the e¤ects of
implementing RFS in only one of the regions. One important implication is that there
will be emissions leakage to the other region. We have simulated a model version identical
to the one above, except that we have split the demand region into two identical demand
regions. When one region imposes an RFS with 20% biofuels, and the other region has
no RFS policy, we nd a leakage rate increasing from 12% initially to almost 35% just
before the fossil resource is fully extracted.13 Thus, global emissions are postponed, and
decline until the "old" depletion time period T . Climate costs are also reduced compared
to BaU-levels despite leakage and an accumulated increase in emissions over time (due to
more biofuels consumption). The reduction in climate costs amounts to 1.5%, versus 3.3%
if both regions implement a 20% RFS share.
6 Discussion and conclusion
We have found that the extraction period of the fossil fuel resource is extended by the
introduction of a renewable fuel standard. This happens even if only a subset of countries
introduces a renewable fuel standard, while the rest of the world continues without. Ex-
traction of fossil fuels will then likely decline initially. Furthermore, even for biofuels that
13These results refer to the inelastic demand function. With elastic demand, leakage is lower initially
but higher later on.
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are almost as emissions-intensive as oil, a standard may then reduce climate costs. The
reason is that it tends to reduce total fuel consumption over the rst decades.
We have also shown that if only a subset of countries introduce a renewable fuel stan-
dard, we will have carbon leakage to the rest of the world. However, we may still have
declining climate costs as global extraction of fossil fuels is postponed, and since total fuel
consumption in the country introducing the standard declines.
Note, however, that despite the benecial climate e¤ect, a renewable fuel standard
always reduces total welfare in our numerical model runs. A renewable fuel standard
implies a subsidy to biofuels alongside a tax on fossil fuels. A subsidy to biofuels hampers
welfare in our model since there are no other externalities than the climate externality.
We treat biofuels as a backstop technology with constant unit costs. As shown by
Chakravorty et al.(2008), this is a reasonable assumption as long as land is abundant. IEA
(2011b) predicts that biofuels may provide 27% of total transport fuel in 2050. Biofuels
crops must then increase from 2% of total arable land today to around 6% in 2050. Much
of this increase, however, will take place on pastures and currently unused land, which is
suitable for second generation biofuels. Furthermore, Schmer et al. (2008) conjectures that
large improvements in both genetics and agroeconomies will increase yields dramatically.
Thus, the rate of technological progress within second generation biofuels could overcome
the problem with land scarcity.
We also assume that biofuels can replace fossil fuels fully when all fossil fuels are
extracted. Whether a total replacement of fossil fuels is possible at reasonable costs seems
to depend on the rate of technological development, for instance, if the experiments with
algae based biofuels will be successful (IEA, 2011b).
Our paper should be seen as a rst attempt to include both dynamic optimization
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and emission from land use change when looking at biofuels policies. Later contributions
should consider replacing the constant unit cost of biofuels assumption with more realistic
biofuels supply schedules, among other taking into account that land quality may vary.
One would then also likely let the carbon sequestered on the converted land vary with
total production.
Our study has focused on the transport sector, and implicitly disregarded oil used in
other sectors. Thus, future research should also consider incorporating fuel demand in
other sectors. Our analysis of the two region model can in fact be alternatively interpreted
as a simple representation of a two sector model, where Region 2 represents demand in
non-transport sectors where the RFS policy does not apply. The numerical results above
then indicate that the climate costs of the RFS policy will still be reduced, especially as
the higher use of oil in Region 2 will lead to less use of other energy goods.
In the analysis above we have considered a time invariant blending mandate. It could
be argued that a more realistic scenario would be to introduce a gradually increasing
share of biofuels, i.e., that  is increasing over time. If so, fossil producers could nd it
protable to enhance their initial extraction as future policies are (expected to be) even
more detrimental to them than current policies. We have briey tested this in our numerical
model, considering linear increases in the blending rate.14 The simulations suggest that
initial extraction and emissions (including those from biofuels) tend to increase if demand
is elastic, but decrease if demand is inelastic. Accumulated climate costs decline in all
our simulations, given our benchmark assumptions. Thus, using the terminology used by
Gerlagh (2011), there may be a weak green paradox if a blending mandate is gradually
introduced (if demand is su¢ ciently elastic), but probably not a strong green paradox.
14That is,  = kt,   b for di¤erent values of k and b.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We rst di¤erentiate 4 with respect to :
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dp0
d
erT + rp0e
rT dT
d
= 0, dp0
d
=  rp0dT
d
(15)
Next, we insert from 1 into 5 and di¤erentiate:
 
Z T
0
D(pC(t))dt+(1 )
Z T
0

b  p0ert + (1  )ertdp0
d

D0(pC(t))dt+(1 )D(b)dT
d
= 0
We notice that the rst term equals  S=(1  ). Inserting for dp0
d
then gives:
  S
(1  )+(1 )
Z T
0
 
b  p0ert

D0(pC(t))

dt (1 )2rp0dT
d
Z T
0

ertD0(pC(t))

dt+(1 )D(b)dT
d
= 0
dT
d

(1  )D(b)  (1  )2rp0
Z T
0

ertD0(pC(t))

dt

=
S
(1  ) (1 )
Z T
0
 
b  p0ert

D0(pC(t))

dt
dT
d
=
1
(1  )2
S   (1  )2 
D(b)  (1  )rp0 > 0 (16)
where   =
Z T
0

(b  p0ert)D0(pC(t))

dt < 0 and  =
Z T
0

ertD0(pC(t))

dt < 0.
This further gives:
dp0
d
=
 rp0
(1  )2
S   (1  )2 
D(b)  (1  )rp0 < 0 (17)
Hence, we have proved the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
We di¤erentiate x(t) with respect to :
dx(t)
d
= D(pC(t)) + (1  )  b  p0ertD0(pC(t))  ertrp0 S   (1  )2 
D(b)  (1  )rp0D
0(pC(t))
= D(pC(t)) +

(1  )  b  p0ert  p0ertr S   (1  )2 
D(b)  (1  )rp0

D0(pC(t)) (18)
The rst term is negative, whereas the last term can be either positive or negative.
Notice that the bracket in front of D0(pC(t)) decreases over time. If the bracket is positive
at t = 0, we obviously have that the whole expression is negative, i.e., x(0) decreases
when  increases. If the bracket is negative at t = 0 (and thus for all t), the bracket will
increase in absolute value over time. If the demand function is concave, i.e., D00(pC(t))  0,
then D0(pC(t)) will also increase in absolute value over time (since pC(t) increases over
time). Thus, the second term will increase over time, and so will the rst term, too.
Hence, dx(t)=d will increase over time. But then we must have dx(0)=d < 0 - otherwise
accumulated resource extraction over time will increase, which is not possible. Moreover,
if the demand function is concave, it follows that fossil extraction will decline for all t < bt
and increase for all t > bt (for some 0 < bt  T ).
Proof of Proposition 3:
We di¤erentiate pC(t) with respect to :
dpC(t)
d
= b  p0ert + (1  )ert  rp0
(1  )2
S   (1  )2 
D(b)  (1  )rp0 (19)
We notice that dp
C(t)
d
is decreasing over time. We also know that dp
C(t)
d
< 0 for t
su¢ ciently close to T , since T increases with . Thus, if we can show that dp
C(0)
d
> 0, we
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have proved the proposition.
With linear demand we have:
  =

T   1
r
(1  e rT ) bD0 and  = 1
r
(erT   1)D0.
Thus, we get:
dpC(0)
d
= p0

erT   1  r S   (1  )
2 
D(b)(1  )  (1  )2rp0

(20)
Next, we derive the following expression for S, where we use thatD(pC) = D
0   pCmax + pC
(pCmax is the choke price, i.e., D(p
C
max) = 0):
S=
Z T
0
x(t)dt = (1  )
Z T
0
D(b+ (1  )p0ert)dt
=(1  )D0
Z T
0
 pCmax +  b+ (1  )p0ert dt
=(1  )D0
  pCmaxT + bT+ (1  ) br  1  e rT 

(21)
We insert this and the expressions for   and  into 20 (note that D(b) = D
0
(b pCmax)):
dpC(0)
d
= p0[e
rT   1
 r (1  )D
0   pCmaxT + 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) br  1  e rT   (1  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D
0
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)2rp0 1r (erT   1)D
0 ]
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#
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
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)be rT   pCmax
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b
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b
(22)
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where
=berT + (1  )b  pCmaxerT   b  (1  )be rT + pCmax + pCmaxrT   brT   (1  )b
+(1  )be rT + (1  )brT   (1  )b+ (1  )be rT
= b

pCmax
b
 
rT + 1  erT +   erT   1  rT+ (1  )  e rT + rT   1
 b  rT + 1  erT +   erT   1  rT+ (1  )  e rT + rT   1
= b (1  )  rT + 1  erT +  e rT + rT   1 = b (1  ) 2rT   erT + e rT  < 0
Here we have used that pCmax > b and 2rT + e rT   erT < 0 for any rT . We see that the
denominator in 22 is negative. Hence, we have shown that the whole expression is positive
for any pCmax > b, so that dp
C(0)
d
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We di¤erentiate y(t) with respect to :
dy(t)
d
=D(pC(t)) + 

b  p0ert + (1  )ertdp0
d

D0(pC(t))
=D(pC(t)) + 
 
b  p0ert

D0(pC(t))  rp0ert S   (1  )
2 
(1  )D(b)  (1  )2rp0D
0(pC(t))(23
The rst term is positive. The second and third terms are zero if either  = 0 or
D0 = 0. Thus, if  is su¢ ciently low initially, or if demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, y(t) will
increase. Furhermore, if t is su¢ ciently close to T , we know from above that the consumer
price falls, implying that y(t) must increase. Hence, we have shown the rst part of the
proposition.
Next, let us show that y(0) decreases if demand is linear and su¢ ciently elastic, and
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 is su¢ ciently large initially. We use the derivations in 22, and insert for  ,  and
D(pC) = D
0   pCmax + pC. Then we get:
dy(t)
d
=D
0
[ pCmax + b+ (1  )p0ert + b  p0ert
 rp0ert
  pCmaxT + bT+ (1  ) br  1  e rT   (1  ) T   1r (1  e rT ) b
(b  pCmax)  (1  )b(1  e rT )
]
=D
0
[ pCmax + 2b+ (1  2)ber(t T )
 ber(t T )
  pCmaxrT + brT  (1  ) rT   2(1  e rT ) b
 pCmax + b+ (1  )be rT
] (24)
If we let  go towards one, we get:
dy(t)
d
! D0  pCmax + 2b  ber(t T )(1 + rT ) (25)
If pCmax is su¢ ciently close to b, we see that the bracket is positive for t = 0, and hence
dy(0)
d
is negative.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Introducing (or increasing) a unit subsidy to biofuels production has the same market
e¤ect as reducing the size of b. Thus, we examine the e¤ects of changing b. Following the
same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 1, we get:
dT
db
=  
Z T
0
D0(pC(t))dt
D(b)  (1  )rp0 > 0 (26)
Thus, T decreases when b declines, or when a subsidy is introduced.
Next, di¤erentiating 1 with respect to b, we get:
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dx(t)
db
= (1  )D0(pC(t))

  (1  )rp0dp0
db
ert

(27)
The only variable that changes over time is ert. Thus, the paranthesis must decrease
over time. We know that if x(t) increases for some t, it must decrease at some other
time (since S is xed). Hence, there must be a bt where the paranthesis is equal to zero.
Then we have that the whole expression must be negative for all t < bt and positive for all
t > bt. In other words, a subsidy to biofuels increases (decreases) fossil fuel consumption
and extraction for all t < (>)bt.
The case of two regions
The RFS rate is now region-specic, i. Equations (1)-(3), as well as the consumer price,
are also then region-specic, while (4) is unchanged. Let S1 and S2 denote accumulated
resource use in the two regions, i.e., S1 =
Z T
0
x1(t)dt and S2 =
Z T
0
x2(t)dt. We then have:
S1 + S2 = S (28)
We are now ready to look at the e¤ects of an increase in i. We insert from (1) into
(5), and then into (28):
X
i
(1  i)
Z T
0
Di(ib+ (1  i)p0ert)dt = S
and di¤erentiate with respect to i
 
Z T
0
Di(p
C
i (t))dt+(1 i)
Z T
0

b  p0ert + (1  i)ert dp0
di

D0i(p
C
i (t))dt+(1 i)Di(b)
dT
di
+
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(1  j)
Z T
0
(1  j)ert dp0
di
D0j(p
C
j (t))dt+ (1  j)Dj(b)
dT
di
= 0
Inserting for dp0
d
from (15), which still holds but is region-specic, gives:
0 =  
Z T
0
Di(p
C
i (t))dt+ (1  i)
Z T
0
 
b  p0ert

D0i(p
C
i (t))

dt+

(1  i)Di(b) + (1  j)Dj(b)  (1  i)2rp0
Z T
0
ertD0i(p
C(t))dt  rp0(1  j)
Z T
0
ertD0j(p
C
j (t))dt

dT
di
which can be rearranged:
dT
di
=
1
1  i
Si    i
(1  i)Di(b) + (1  j)Dj(b)  i   j > 0 (29)
where  i = (1 i)2
Z T
0

(b  p0ert)D0i(pCi (t))

dt < 0, i = (1 i)2rp0
Z T
0
ertD0i(p
C
i (t))dt <
0 and j = rp0(1   j)
Z T
0
ertD0j(p
C
j (t))dt < 0. Note that  i, i and can all be treated as
constants (given the new paths for pCi (t) and p
C
j (t) and the new T ). Since
dp0
di
=  rp0 dTdi ,
it follows that dp0
d
< 0.
For the change in total fossil fuel extraction we have:
dxi(t)
di
+
dxj(t)
di
= Di(pCi (t)) + (1  i)D0i(pCi (t))(b  p0ert)
+

(1  i)2D0i(pCi (t)) + (1  j)2D0j(pCj (t))

ert
dp0
di
(30)
The two rst terms are negative: Increasing the RFS decreases the use of fossil fuels
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for a given consumer price on transportation fuel and increases the consumer price on
transporation fuel for a given price on fossil fuels. On the other hand, the last term is
positive as the price on fossil fuels falls, having a downward e¤ect on the consumer price
in both regions. We know that extraction must increase at some point since extraction
now last longer. It must then decline at other points since the amount of resource is given.
To see what happens at t = 0, we rearrange (30) we obtain the following expression for
dxi(t)
di
+
dxj(t)
di
:
 Di(pCi (t))  r(1  j)2D0j(pCj (t))p0ert
Si    i
(1  i)Di(b) + (1  j)Dj(b)  i   j
+(1  i)

b  p0ert   rp0ert Si    i
(1  i)Di(b) + (1  j)Dj(b)  i   j

D0i(p
C
i (t)) (31)
The rst term is negative, and will become less negative over time since the consumer-
price on transportation fuel pCi (t) must increase over time. The next term is positive, and
it must increases over time as long as the demand function is concave, i.e., D00j (p
C(t))  0.
Hence, if the sum of the rst and the second term is positive, the sum will stay positive
and increase in value for all t until T .
The bracket in the last term decreases over time. If the bracket is negative at t = 0,
the whole term is positive intially. Moreover, it will become more and more positive over
time as long as D00i (p
C(t))  0. If the bracket is positive at t = 0, the whole term is
negative initially. At some time t < T the bracket will become negative, and then the
second term will become more and more positive over time as long as D00i (p
C(t))  0. In
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the time interval [0; ti the terms in brackets will decrease towards zero, while the derivative
D0i(p
C
i (t)) will stay constant or become more negative (as long as D
00
i (p
C(t))  0).
There are only two ways in which the whole expression in (31) can be positive for t = 0.
The sum of the rst and second term can be positive and the last term can be positive.
However, then the whole expression will stay positive for all t < T . This is inconsistent
with the fact that extraction time increases. Thus, this case can be ruled out.
The last term could be negative, but still the whole expression could be positive for
t = 0. This implies that the sum of the rst and second term is positive initially, and
that this sum is larger than the absolute value of the second term. However, we know
that the sum of the rst and second term is increasing in t. Hence, in order for the whole
expression to become negative at some point, the second term must become more negative.
This cannot happen if D00i (p
C(t)) = 0. Hence, it follows that if D00i (p
C(t)) = 0, total fossil
extraction will decline for all t < bt and increase for all t > bt (for some 0 < bt < T ). For the
other cases dxi(0)
di
+
dxj(0)
di
is ambiguous.
For the e¤ects on the consumer price pCi (t) in Region i we have:
@pCi (t)
@i
= b  p0ert + (1  i)ert dp0
di
Note that the sum of the two rst terms are positive (for t < T ), while the last term
is negative. We know that dp
C(t)
d
< 0 for t su¢ ciently close to T , since T increases with .
What about the e¤ect at t = 0? Using that dp0
di
=  rp0 dTdi and that p0 = be rT we have:
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@pCi (0)
@i
= b

1  e rT   rTe rT (1  i)
T
dT
di

= b

1  e rT   re rT Si    i
(1  i)Di(b) + (1  j)Dj(b)  i   j

>b

1  e rT   re rT Si    i
(1  i)Di(b)  i

> 0;
where we use the ndings for one region in Section 1.4 (cf. (20)) in the last inequality.
Hence, total fuel consumption in Region i declines initially. Initial consumption of fossil
fuels in this region must then also decline.
For the region not changing its blending mandate, we have:
@pCj (t)
@i
= (1  j)ert dp0
di
< 0
It follows that Region j will use more of the resource at all times. Thus, we have:
dSj
di
> 0 and dSi
di
< 0. It also follows that Region j will use more biofuels in each period,
given that j > 0.
Proof of equation (14)
Consider the following simple optimization problem, where the resource constraint is
ignored:
max
Z 1
0
e rt [F (x(t); y(t)  C(A1(t) + A2(t)] dt (32)
where x and y stand for fossil fuel use and biofuel use, respectively. The net benet
(ignoring climate e¤ects) function F is strictly increasing and concave, and the climate
cost function C has the properties C 0 > 0 and C 00  0. Total carbon in the atmosphere is
given by A1 + A2, and is a state variable in the optimization problem.
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We assume that x can be chosen freely at any time. In order to avoid jumps in the
state variables, we assume y is a state variable developing according to
_y(t) = u(t) where u(t) 2 [ u; u]
Any change in y must thus occur via the control variable u di¤ering from zero. We
assume u is large, so that jumps in y are "almost possible".
Previously, we assumed that any jump in y was associated with a corresponding jump
on the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. Now any change in y will be captured by the
change in the atmosphere being gradual and proportional to u:
_A1(t)=  [x(t) + `u(t)]
_A2(t)= (1  ) [x(t) + `u(t)]  A2(t)
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the development of carbon in the atmosphere
when x and y are constant equal to x and y. In this case the long-run equilibrium is
characterized by u = 0 and A2 constant equal to
A2 =
1  

x
while A1(t) will be given by
A1(t) = A1(0) + 
Z t
0
x(t)dt+ ` (y   y(0))

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Hence,
A(t) = A1(0) +
1  

x + 
Z t
0
x(t)dt+ ` (y   y(0))

which will be growing over time unless x = 0. If x = 0, A will be higher the higher is
the level of biofuel production.
Returning to the maximization problem (32), the current value Hamiltonian is (formu-
lated with positive costate variables and ignoring time references)
H =F (x; y)  C(A1 + A2)
+u  1 [x(t) + `u(t)]  2 f(1  ) [x(t) + `u(t)]  A2(t)g
The optimal solution must satisfy
Fx(x(t); y(t))  [1(t) + (1  )2(t)] = 0 for x(t) > 0 (33)
(t)  ` [1(t) + (1  )2(t)] = 0 for u(t) 2 ( u; u) (34)
_(t) = r(t)  Fy(x(t); y(t)) (35)
_1(t) = r1(t) + C
0(A1(t) + A2(t)) (36)
_2(t) = (r + )2(t) + C
0(A1(t) + A2(t)) (37)
Limt!1e rt(t)y(t) = 0 (38)
Limt!1e rti(t)Ai(t) = 0 i = 1; 2 (39)
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The equations above imply that
(t) =
Z 1
0
e rzFy(x(t+ z); y(t+ z))dz (40)
1(t) + (1  )2(t) = qx(t) given by (9)
For an interior solution at any time when y does not "jump" we thus have
Fx(x(t); y(t))= qx(t) (41)
(t)= `qx(t) (42)
There is not much one can say about the ratio Fy=Fx for the general case of C 00 > 0.
We therefore restrict ourselves to the special case of the equilibrium value of C 0 rising at
a constant rate m 2 [0; r). One interpretation of the case m > 0 was given in section 3.
A second interpretation could be that the functions in the optimization problem are such
that the solution gives a constant growth rate of C 0.
Inserting C 0 = C 00e
mt into (9) gives
qx(t) =


r  m +
1  
r +   m

C 00e
mt (43)
From (42) it follows that (t) must grow at the rate m, and from (40) this implies that Fy
grows at the rate m and that
(t) =
Fy(x(t); y(t))
r  m
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Together with (42) we thus get
Fy(x(t); y(t))  qy(t) = (r  m)`qx(t)
and hence
qy(t)
qx(t)
= (r  m)`

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